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Understanding the Inarticulateness of Museum Visitors’ Experience of 
Paintings: A Phenomenological Study of Adult Non-Art Specialists 
 





This paper is based on a study of museum visitors’ experience of paintings: in particular, the 
experience of adult non-art specialists. Phenomenology, a form of inquiry that seeks to articulate 
lived experience, provided the philosophical and methodological framework for the study. 
Descriptions and themes relating to the experience of paintings were generated from interviews 
conducted with eight participants. These themes were categorized into two major areas: the 
articulated aspects and the non-articulated aspects. The former refers to aspects that people can 
articulate when they describe their experience. For example, they talk about the formal qualities 
of paintings, related textual information, and the museum environment. The latter refers to aspects 
that people cannot articulate. For example, they have difficulty in expressing their feelings, their 
relationship with time, and an understanding of the role of the body. This paper focuses on the 
aspects that museum visitors cannot articulate when they describe their experience. This 
inarticulateness provides insights into certain overlooked features of the experience: the embodied 
nature of the experience, the way time is experienced, and the viewer’s feelings about paintings. 
The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the study for art educators. It is suggested 
that teachers should prepare students in ways that will enable them to make use of their various 






Having been a teacher of art for more than twenty 
years and being currently involved in the preparation 
of school art teachers, I am deeply interested in the 
ways in which museum visitors look at paintings. 
Some walk hastily through a museum, stopping in 
front of a painting for less than a minute, while others 
shuffle from one painting to another and pause at 
every one they come across. Some visitors walk very 
close to a painting; they read every line of the caption, 
look at the painting again and then look back at the 
caption. Some people appear to look without a 
particular orientation and simply glance all over the 
gallery, but others seem to know exactly what they 
want to see and go straight to a specific work. Some 
will make notes or sketches while they look, but 
many more just gaze solemnly and silently. But what 
exactly happens to museum visitors’ minds, as well as 
to their bodies, when they are looking at paintings? 
What do they see, think and feel? Are such 
experiences “aesthetic experience”, a term commonly 
found in art textbooks and used by philosophers, art 
educators as well as the media? What is it like for 
people who have no specialist training in art to 
experience paintings in a museum? What does such 
an experience mean to these people? In response to 
these questions, I developed and conducted a study 
which focused particularly on the experience of 
museum visitors who do not know much about art 
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history or art theories, for most of my students and 
their students belong to this category.   
 
Research Focus and Rationale: The Experience of 
Non-Art Specialists 
 
To many philosophers of the analytic tradition and 
their heirs, especially to theorists of modernism, 
museum visitors’ experience of paintings is an 
“aesthetic experience”. They believe that aesthetic 
experience is a distinctive kind of experience in 
which people engage in a disinterested contemplation 
of the visual or aesthetic qualities of paintings. 
However, this use of the term “aesthetic experience” 
to describe the experience of art is too limiting, as 
Noël Carroll (2001) points out: 
 
Different artworks ask for or mandate or 
prescribe many different kinds of 
responses, whose appropriateness is best 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. To 
attempt to call them aesthetic experiences 
or to reserve that label for only the best of 
them simply courts confusion and even, 
unfortunately, rancour. (p. 61)   
 
The meaning of the term “aesthetic experience” has 
been complicated by a variety of “prejudices”, 
“resistances”, “suspicion”, and “connotations” 
(Maclagan, 2001, p. 9). In this study, I elected to use 
the term “museum visitors’ experience of paintings” 
(or “the experience of paintings”), for the sake of its 
clarity and its independence of the many established 
preconceptions. The scope of the study was limited to 
museum visitors’ experiences associated with 
paintings – the art form that most people talked about 
when I began interviewing them about their 
experiences in a museum. The term “museums” is 
used here to refer to art museums and galleries, with 
most of their collections and exhibitions devoted to 
visual art objects. 
 
Previous scholarship and research into the experience 
of art has focused on the portrayal of “successful” 
experience or what Abigail Housen (2001, p. 2) called 
“expert viewing”: that is, on the experiences of people 
trained in art-related disciplines. These experiences 
are characterized by total absorption, heightened 
feeling and great joy (see, for instance, Abbs, 1994; 
Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Funch, 1997). 
The implication is that only the experiences of expert 
viewers are legitimate, and these experiences become 
the goals which we try to attain. However, I argue 
that it is important to understand how non-specialists 
– that is, people with an “ordinary” artistic 
background – experience paintings. After all, they 
greatly outnumber people with expert artistic 
knowledge, and it should be of interest to art 
educators and museum educators to understand their 
experiences. Some empirical studies have focused on 
particular aspects of the experience, such as emotions 
and feelings (e.g. Linko, 2003), aesthetic develop-
ment (e.g. Housen, 2001), cognition (e.g. Leinhardt, 
Tittle & Knutson, 2002), the kinds of satisfaction 
derived from the experience (e.g. Pekarik, Doering & 
Karns, 1999) and visitors’ interpretive strategies (e.g. 
Hooper-Greenhill & Moussouri, 2001). However, 
none of these studies addresses the problem from a 
phenomenological perspective. Before going on to 
examine the experience of the participants in my 
study, I explain the phenomenological method that 
was employed. 
 
Philosophical and Methodological Frameworks: 
Phenomenology 
 
Phenomenology, emphasizing the lived meaning of 
embodied experience, was the methodology used for 
the study. It was chosen for its ability to capture the 
immediacy and subjectivity of experience. 
Phenomenology, and in particular hermeneutic 
phenomenology, does not claim to provide universal 
explanations. It is more concerned with the search for 
understanding, meaning, contextualization, and 
interpretation. The validity of a phenomenological 
study lies in its capacity to generate sympathetic 
thought or agreement from readers, as well as in its 
rigour and in the appropriateness of the procedures 
used to collect and analyse data (Pollio, Henley & 
Thompson, 1997). 
 
Unlike the Cartesian view that the mind is 
independent of the body and the external world, the 
basic tenet of phenomenology is that mind and body 
co-constitute each other as an inseparable unity. 
Understood phenomenologically, mind and body are 
one, and “human beings both have a body and are a 
body” (Pollio, Henley & Thompson, 1997, p. 5). It 
would be wrong to view the body as a ‘thing’ and 
attempt to understand it as an object. “Bodies are 
thoughtful bodies just as minds are embodied minds” 
(Becker, 1992, p. 16). Therefore, the methodology 
approaches human experience as a total experience 
involving the viewer’s mind and body, affective and 
cognitive faculties, and feeling and understanding, 
with an emphasis on the reciprocity of various 
elements. The emphasis on the situatedness of human 
experience is also helpful in enabling an 
understanding of the connection between museum 
visitors’ experience and their other lived experiences. 
The methodology is sensitive to the context of the 
experience, taking into consideration the viewer’s 
personal contribution and orientation in the encounter.  
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The Participants and the Interviews  
 
In order to obtain accounts of people’s lived 
experience of paintings, I looked for individuals who 
had had such an experience. Although I do not belong 
to the category of non-art specialists, my own 
experiences, as well as first-person accounts of 
museum visitors’ experience found in published texts, 
were used to initiate the study. As noted by Maykut 
and Morehouse (1994), the phenomenological 
approach involves “a close examination of people’s 
words, actions, and documents in order to discern 
patterns of meaning which come out of this data” (p. 
16). Van Manen (1997) also suggests looking for 
documentation of lived experience from “a multitude 
of expressions or forms” (p. 92). Therefore, this study 
also collected, used and analysed experiential 
accounts drawn from poems, novels, diaries and 
research related to the experience being studied.     
 
A major part of the data collection focused on the 
experiences of eight adult non-art specialists (referred 
to as participants hereafter) who visit museums on a 
regular basis, ranging from twice a year to once a 
month. Five women and three men, ranging in age 
from the early twenties to middle forties, were 
selected as participants for the study. Their 
educational backgrounds ranged from secondary 
education to PhD studies. Most of them had studied 
art until junior secondary school (age fifteen). The 
participants’ past and current occupations had no 
direct relation to art or art-related disciplines. Their 
family backgrounds did not seem to make any 
significant impact on their interest in paintings and 
museums. They are regular museum-goers and they 
like to talk about their experiences in museums. I 
invited them to participate because they (1) had 
numerous experiences of paintings in a museum; (2) 
were able to talk and provide detailed descriptions of 
their experiences; (3) were willing to participate in 
the research and be involved in lengthy interviews; 
and (4) were interested in understanding the nature 
and meaning of their experiences.   
 
Potential participants were approached and briefed 
about the background of the research and the nature 
of their involvement. They understood that they 
would be interviewed once or twice and that each 
interview would last from one to two hours. They also 
knew that the interview would be audio-recorded and 
transcribed and that the data collected might be used 
for publication. Each participant signed a consent 
form, stating that participation in the study was 
voluntary, that participants might choose to withdraw 
from the study at any time, and that they were assured 
of anonymity and confidentiality.   
 
The First Interviews 
 
The first interviews with the participants took place in 
a variety of locations, but were usually conducted in 
cafés or restaurants close to the participants’ offices 
or places of study. Each participant was interviewed 
separately. As I did not know most of the participants 
well before the interviews, I usually started by 
offering a brief explanation of the study and asking 
them to talk about their families and educational 
backgrounds. Participants also talked about the 
museums which they usually visited and their interest 
in paintings and museums. The first part of the 
interview was a conversation to gain an understanding 
of the participant and to establish mutual trust and 
confidence. After the first conversation, participants 
soon got used to being audio-recorded. During these 
interviews, participants were invited to: 
 
1. reflect on their previous experiences with 
paintings in any context; 
2. share instances that stood out from these 
experiences, in particular those in a museum 
setting; and 
3. talk about how these experiences related to 
them personally. 
 
In general, the first interview took longer than the 
second interview, as some of the time was devoted to 
the introduction of the participants themselves. 
Participants also had an abundance of previous 
experiences of paintings to share. The first interview 
usually lasted for an hour and a half to two hours. 
Usually the interviews came to an end when the 
participants said that they had no more experiences to 
share. In general, the experiences described in the 
first interviews were ‘memorable’ experiences of 
paintings in a museum. The participants talked mainly 
about experiences in international museums visited 
when they had travelled abroad. Both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ experiences were mentioned. Sometimes, 
participants could not remember details about the 
paintings they had seen. For example, they had 
forgotten the title of the painting or even the subject 
matter, but they remembered certain qualities of the 
painting, such as its use of colours, or particular 
aspects of the experience, such as the feeling of being 
inside the painting. As participants recalled their past 
experiences, they portrayed these in a more 
condensed and focused manner than in the second 
interviews. 
 
The Second Interviews 
 
After the first interview, a visit to the Hong Kong 
Museum of Art or another art museum was then 
scheduled, and interviews took place immediately 
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after the visit. The time between the first and second 
interviews was two weeks to a month. This was 
dependent on the availability of the participants as 
well as on my having developed themes generated 
from the first interview. Before we sat down for the 
second interview, the participants were encouraged to 
walk around the museum on their own. They knew 
that they would be talking about some of the paintings 
they had seen in the museum. As is typical of 
phenomenological research, the interviews followed 
the flow of the conversation, rather than being 
organized around specific pre-determined questions. 
 
During the second interview, I also discussed with the 
participants some of the themes that had emerged 
from the first interview. Sometimes I asked them to 
elaborate on specific issues and sometimes I sought 
clarification of certain themes. The second interview 
usually lasted for an hour. The participants talked 
about their experiences in a more fluid and 
spontaneous way. Besides having a better knowledge 
of me and the research, the participants knew what 
the interview would be like and anticipated what they 
were going to talk about. They were able to describe 
the paintings in more detail. During the second 
interview, themes or topics which had emerged from 
the first interview appeared again, but were now 
embellished with examples and references to the 
paintings.     
 
Interviews were transcribed, and subsequently 
descriptions of the participants’ experiences were 
constructed and common themes underlying each 
experience were developed. When working on these 
descriptions and themes, I employed specific 
phenomenological perspectives developed by Max van 
Manen (1997), as well as referring to the existing 
literature to interpret participants’ experiences. In the 
following sections, I show how the study contributes to 
an understanding of the experience as a whole, and 
discuss the implications for art education in particular. 
 
Results of the Study: Inarticulate Feeling, Time 
and Body 
 
Phenomenologists look for presence and absence, 
parts and wholes, and particulars and generals in a 
phenomenon. In this vein, I believe that something 
unsaid is as important as something said. I therefore 
looked not only at what the participants were able to 
articulate in describing their experience of paintings, 
but also at what they were unable to articulate. This is 
relevant in the practice of painting as well: what is 
painted and what is not painted may be equally 
important. In traditional Chinese paintings, what is 
not painted, or the ‘blank’ area, assumes “significance 
beyond the painted scene” (Guo1 in Li, 1981/1988, p. 
216). Such blank areas communicate something that 
cannot be communicated through visual forms and 
allow the viewer tremendous possibilities in personal 
interpretation. Jean Grondin (1998), in discussing 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s ideas of art and the 
experience of art, also notes that: 
 
When confronted with a work of art, 
something strikes us, invites us to rethink, 
rediscover our experience, yet we cannot 
translate its “proposition” in another 
language. (p. 270) 
 
For most of the time during the interviews, the 
participants were able to respond using gestures and 
eye contact, to express themselves verbally and 
reflect on their experience. However, phrases like 
“it’s difficult to tell”, “how to say it?”, “I don’t know 
how to describe it”, “no, no … it’s difficult to say it 
exactly” occasionally emerged. At other times, 
silences or pauses occurred when they talked about 
certain aspects of their experience. These sporadic 
points of inarticulateness or inexpressiveness 
interested me. In my own experience, this was quite 
different from what happens when engaging people in 
talking about a film or a book. Then they are usually 
more fluent and straightforward. I am not the first to 
detect such inarticulateness in describing the 
experience of works of art. Sutton (2003), Maclagan 
(2001), Funch (1997), Abbs (1994), Weltz1-Fairchild 
(1991) and Moncrieff (1989) have all made the same 
observation. In this paper, I will discuss the non-
articulated aspects of the experience by focusing on 
two questions: What does it mean when museum 
visitors experience a certain kind of inarticulateness 
when they talk about their experience of paintings? In 
what ways does such inarticulateness help us better 
understand the experience?   
 
1.  We have difficulty describing our feelings 
 
A recurring theme that appeared during most of the 
interviews was that participants had difficulties in 
fully expressing their feelings.   
 
We do not know how to describe our feelings  
Some participants said that they had certain feelings 
but they did not know how to describe them. They 
                                                 
1 Born during the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127 A.D.), 
Guo Xi (c.1020 – c.1090) was a court official as well as a 
renowned painter who specialized in landscape painting. He 
was the author of the book Linquan Gaozhi (Lofty Record of 
Forests and Streams), a collection of Guo’s views on the 
techniques and purposes of Chinese landscape paintings. 
 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 2   September 2008  Page 5 of 11 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
searched for and found some words, but it seemed 
that there was still a certain quality of the feeling not 
yet articulated. For example, one of the participants, 
Yoko2, talking about the painting Let Me Be [Figure 
1], was not able to pin down her feeling exactly: 
 
I have a lot of questions in mind. The 
feeling is immediate but it’s difficult to tell 
exactly what it is. How to say it? I feel 
peaceful, comfortable, warm, smooth … I 






Let Me Be, 1971 
Han Zhixun (1922- ) 
Acrylic on canvas 
Hong Kong Museum of Art 
 
Another participant, Ken, was simply not clear about 
his feeling: 
 
I don’t know how to describe the way I 
feel. The sphere is composed of many 
layers and it makes me think of plants like 
onion and lettuce. Considering the title of 
the painting [Break Through I] [Figure 2], I 
think that it has successfully created the 










Break Through I 
Zhou Luyun (1924- ) 
Ink and colour on paper 
135 cm x 65.5 cm 
Hong Kong Museum of Art 
 
 
                                                 
2 Participants in the study have been given pseudonyms to 
ensure confidentiality 
Judging from the experience of Yoko and Ken, there 
seems to be something that is beyond the capacity of 
language to express or to capture.   
 
We have difficulty describing what it is like to 
experience paintings 
Sometimes participants used terms like “resonance”, 
“unifying”, “have a life of its own” or “enrich”, which 
are abstract and open to interpretation; they were not 
able to articulate fully what they meant. When they 
were asked to say something more about it, they just 
repeated the same thing or went back to describing 
the painting again. It seems that they had an intuitive 
understanding of these terms or phrases but did not 
know how to elaborate on their meanings. The 
following are two extracts from interviews with a 
participant, Connie, when she talked about Van 
Gogh’s paintings in general: 
 
Yes … a sense of unifying. But it is 
difficult to explain. … . His works are 
different from classical paintings that show 
everything three-dimensionally, with great 
detail, and produce a photo-realistic effect. 
Van Gogh does not paint in this way. … At 
first sight, it is obvious that it is a painting. 
But within the painting, I sense something 
more than a painting. It’s this quality that 
stands out from the experience of 
paintings. This quality is what I call the 
power of life. 
 
Even to a layperson like me, Van Gogh’s 
paintings can show his passion and I can 
feel it. The emotions of the artist draw me 
into a stage of resonance. Even if it’s a 
clump of grass, you can feel that the grass 
is alive. … I think … let me think … I 
think resonance means … [laugh] it is very 
difficult to make it clear. Anyway, it is like 
… perhaps we use the term very often, but 
indeed we …   
 
In the above extracts, Connie mentions having “a 
sense of unifying” and entering “a stage of 
resonance”. However, when using these phrases, she 
insisted that she was a layperson and therefore 
presumably had no special knowledge of what they 
meant.   
 
We do not understand how and why feelings are 
created when we look at paintings 
Although participants were not asked to explain why 
they had a certain feeling or how they came to have 
an association, they tried to give reasons or 
justifications. However, on some occasions, they had 
difficulty offering an explanation. For example, Irene, 
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another participant in the study, could not understand 
why she experienced a sense of the spiritual when she 
saw Cézanne’s painting L’Etang des Soeurs, Osny: 
 
For the spiritual, it could be … it’s very 
strong and spiritual and philosophical. It’s 
very different from seeing other Western 
paintings. [pause] I think spiritual … I 
don't know why … I don't exactly know 
why I feel this way. 
 
Yoko did not understand how paintings and poems 
worked to convey feelings: 
   
I think it’s the images of people described 
in poems or paintings that matter. Perhaps 
it is their shapes and forms. No, it’s 
difficult to tell. I don’t know how to say it. 
Sometimes a few words or a few images 
can be very powerful.  
 
Yoko also had difficulties explaining how she came 
to feel what she felt. She wanted to explain or justify 
her feelings but she could not: 
   
… the earthy colour makes the painting 
[The Homeless] [Figure 3] look miserable. 
I don’t know how to describe the ways in 
which these colours create a miserable 










The Homeless, 1987 
Zhu Xinghua (1935- ) 
Ink and colour on paper 
163 cm x 95 cm 
Hong Kong Museum of Art 
 
In the situations referred to above, the participants 
had unanswered questions. These questions focused 
mainly on feelings that arose when they were directly 
in front of the painting. The participants sometimes 
could not see a connection between what they saw 
and what they felt.     
 
Discussion and reflections 
I suggest that there are three possible ways of 
accounting for the participants’ inarticulateness when 
trying to describe their feelings. The first is that the 
feelings they had while experiencing the paintings 
were not clear to the participants. Perhaps the feeling 
was too mixed, too vague or too complicated. The 
second is that the participant was clear about how he 
or she felt but was unable to put it into words. This is 
different from the first case in that it implies that a 
certain inexpressible quality about the feeling or an 
inadequacy of language made it impossible for the 
feeling to be clearly articulated. The third possibility 
is that participants were responding to certain 
established beliefs (for example, those contained in 
modernist and expressionist theory) about feelings 
and paintings that they had picked up piecemeal. 
 
During normal museum visits, people do not talk 
about their experience. They just walk and look. It 
was only in the situation of being interviewed that the 
participants began to think back, and somehow they 
wanted to talk about their feelings about the paintings. 
In our natural pre-reflective state of being, we seldom 
notice ourselves along with the object of our 
consciousness. It was therefore easier for the 
participants to describe what they saw – the paintings, 
the museum environment or the people around them – 
than what they felt. It seems that this inarticulateness 
in describing an experience of paintings reflects the 
nature of the experience: a bodily involvement with 
paintings with no consciousness of such involvement. 
Such bodily involvement can be seen in Connie’s 
mentioning of “unifying” and “resonance”. The word 
“resonance” is derived from the Latin word 
resonantia, which means “echo” (Barnhart, 1995, p. 
657), a hearing of one’s own voice. 
 
Museum visitors’ difficulties in describing their 
feelings may be related to the nature of reflection or 
recollection. Human experience is a constant flow, 
with one experience following another. We may 
recollect experience, but we cannot have an 
experience in exactly the same way as we had it in the 
past, for our current experience always takes previous 
experiences into account.  Any account of experience 
captures only part of the total sum of the experience. 
Therefore, people’s reflections on their experiences 
are “not introspective but retrospective” in nature, and 
are not the entirety, but merely instances, of a 
phenomenon (Van Manen, 1997, p. 10). There will be 
a loss of detail in such a retrospective activity. 
Phenomenologists never deny that a recollection of 
experience is inevitability a “lesser” version of the 
actual lived experience, in the sense that we can never 
recount all the details of an experience during the act 
of recollection. However, a recollection is also an 
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“expanded” version of the lived experience, since it 
takes into account the meanings of the experience 
accumulated over time.   
 
When we are asked to recount our experience of 
paintings in a museum verbally, we are in a way 
navigating between words and images. Words and 
images are two sets of symbols that we use to 
represent ourselves and the world surrounding us. 
Although they share many similar aspects and there 
are many occasions on which one may be substituted 
for the other, there is still a certain mystery about how 
words and images interact with each other. 
Comparing the relation between words and images to 
a dialectical trope, W. J. Mitchell (1996, p. 50) 
suggests that it is “a relay between semiotic, aesthetic, 
and social differences” and is “subject to finite 
variation, historical transformation and geographical 
dislocation”. It is still unclear how words become lost 
when images are being discussed, but it is certainly 
the case that vision, images or visual experiences are 
not easily reducible to words or language. The 
inexpressibility of a feeling, which is often a feature 
of an experience of paintings in a museum, may result 
from the gap between words and pictures that 
Mitchell speaks of. 
 
Another possible explanation for the inexpressibility 
of the feelings of the participants may be that the 
participants held the belief that paintings must create 
feelings – an expectation commonly found among 
members of the general public regarding the nature 
and experience of paintings. The participants 
therefore expected certain feelings to arise when they 
saw the paintings in the museum, but actually 
responded in ways other than emotionally. Therefore, 
when asked about what or how they felt, they had 
difficulty in describing it. 
 
2.  We forget time 
 
The participants in this study seldom spoke of time 
when they talked about their experience. When they 
were asked about their experience of time, they had 
difficulty describing it. Talking about the painting 
The Homeless [Figure 3], Yoko did not know 
 
… how long I have looked at the painting. 
The environment is quiet, as this painting is 
not an arresting one and therefore only 
very few people are around. … I cannot tell 
how long I have been standing in front of 
this painting. Certainly it is longer than 
when seeing other paintings. I am not 
conscious of the time, therefore I cannot 
tell  how long it takes. 
 
Another participant, Mandy, did not know how much 
time she had spent 
  
… standing in front of the painting 
[They’re Growing Up] [Figure 4], but it 
does not last long. Then I continue to walk 
through the whole gallery and come back 






They’re Growing up, 
1996 
Deng Ningzi  
Mixed media on  
canvas 
159 cm x 206.5 cm 
Hong Kong Museum  
of Art 
 
Ken also did not notice the passage of time and he 
thought that  
 
there should be plenty of time for me to 
walk around the gallery and I plan to have 
a short rest before joining our classmates. 
However, I am late. When I finish walking, 
my classmates are already there waiting for 
me. I am not conscious of the passage of 
time as I am walking around. 
 
Evident in all three of the cases quoted above is that, 
in a museum, “time seems to slow as perception 
sharpens” (Burnham & Kai-Kee, 2005, p. 65). The 
participants’ sense of temporality had vanished.  
Usually, when we experience something pleasant or 
something that we enjoy, “time flies”. Does this then 
mean that museum visitors’ experience of paintings is 
necessarily pleasant or enjoyable? Judging from the 
descriptions of Yoko, Mandy and Ken, museum 
visitors’ experience of paintings would be more aptly 
described as meaningful than as pleasant or 
enjoyable. In the case of Yoko, she felt sad or even 
disturbed about the homeless people depicted in the 
painting. For Mandy, her experience of They’re 
Growing Up brought back childhood memories and 
reflections on her past and future life. Ken admired 
the technical capabilities of the painter and wanted to 
learn from the painting. So perhaps the dimension of 
time vanishes when museum visitors are absorbed in 
what they see – when what they see is meaningful, 
but not necessarily pleasant. Time is experienced 
when we are conscious of it. The participants’ 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 2   September 2008  Page 8 of 11 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
inarticulateness or lack of comments about time may 
be seen as another reflection of the nature of the 
experience. The participants were completely 
absorbed and did not have a sense of how time was 
passing.  
 
Time has an ongoing dynamic and is experienced in 
an “unexperienced” manner. “If no one asks me what 
time is, I know; if I am asked, I do not know” 
(Macann, 1993, p. 197-198). Therefore, when 
participants talked about objective time or the time 
that they spent on a painting, they became 
inarticulate. From another perspective, the 
participants’ unawareness of clock time may be 
interpreted as an indication that they were involved in 
what Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) called 
“reflective time” instead of “objective time”. 
According to Martin Heidegger (1927/1976), 
reflective time is understood as time linked explicitly 
to the experiencing person and cannot be analysed in 
isolation from that person. Participants engaged in 
numerous reflections during their experience of 
paintings in a museum. Such reflections took the form 
of both images and words, and ranged from thoughts 
about personal life to reflections on social issues, and 
from recollections of childhood events to recent 
memories. The viewer may thus be seen not as an 
individual experiencing time, but as a subject 
constituting time, during such an experience. 
 
3.  We forget our body 
 
In their experiential accounts, the participants 
mentioned paintings, reproductions, feelings, images, 
words, people and the museum environment. 
However, what lies hidden behind the experience of 
things, objects or people is the body. What is a body? 
“The body is a centre, a point of view on which I 
cannot take up a point of view” (Macann, 1993, p. 
173). Therefore, we often forget that we experience 
with our body. A body is not only the physical 
substance that composes our external physicality; it is 
the body or I who feels, touches, sees, relates and 
thinks. Perhaps it is the structure of language as well 
as the structure of the experience that keeps the body 
hidden or inarticulate. This apparent “absence” of the 
body seems to allow the object to become present.  In 
museum visitors’ experience of paintings, therefore, 
the inarticulateness of the body allows other aspects 
of the experience to be articulated.     
 
I find it particularly useful to understand the 
inarticulate body in museum visitors’ experience of 
paintings in terms of the “tacit knowing” and “bodily 
indwelling” suggested by Michael Polanyi (1958). 
Polanyi, who began as a scientist and later became a 
philosopher, talked about inarticulate intelligence and 
tacit knowing in his book Personal Knowledge 
(1958). In The Tacit Dimension (1966), Polanyi 
claims that “we can know more than we can tell” (p. 
4). Polanyi (1958) identifies two kinds of awareness 
in knowing: “subsidiary awareness and focal 
awareness” (p. 58). Take reading as an example: 
when we are reading printed words in English, we are 
aware of the meaning of the sentences, and such 
awareness is basically built on our awareness that the 
words are written in English, following specific 
sentence structures and grammatical rules (Gill, 
2000). This awareness of the meaning of the 
sentences is focal awareness. That is something 
explicit, something that we can describe. The 
awareness of the grammatical rules and of the fact 
that the language is English is subsidiary awareness. 
This is something tacit, something that we usually 
cannot describe. Therefore, we rely on some things 
that we are not aware of in order to focus on others 
that we are aware of. As summarized by Polanyi 
(1966), “we attend from something for attending to 
something else” (p. 10). From this observation, 
Polanyi differentiates two types of knowing: tacit 
knowing and explicit knowing. Tacit knowing has 
more to do with subsidiary awareness and bodily 
activity, while explicit knowing has more to do with 
focal awareness and conceptual activity (Gill, 2000).   
 
Another concept proposed by Polanyi is that of 
“indwelling”, an idea closely related to the 
phenomenological perspective of lived body or 
embodiment. To Polanyi, the tacit dimension of 
knowing can only be achieved by our “indwelling” in 
the subsidiary. Using the reading example again, 
“indwelling” means that we are using or practising 
English in a way that we are unaware of. With regard 
to the experience of paintings, “indwelling” may be 
understood as “wandering about” in paintings or as 
the “imaginative inhabitation” of paintings, two terms 
proposed by Maclagan (2001) in his discussion of 
people’s experience of paintings (p. 36). “By means 
of our embodiment, we come to live in or ‘indwell’ 
the things and ideas, people and institutions, that 
make up the natural and social worlds that surround 
us” (Gill, 2000, pp. 39-40). By dwelling in the 
particular or the subsidiary, the body interacts with 
the surrounding physical and social environment in 
which tacit knowledge is created. Bodily indwelling 
is a way in which we engage in tacit knowing. 
 
Polanyi’s view on tacit knowing provides insights 
which help us to interpret the inarticulateness of 
people talking about their experience of paintings in a 
museum. The tacit mode of knowing is a kind of 
immersion in the context of the knowing situation, 
involving the knower’s senses, knowledge, body, 
experiences, and various cognitive, social and cultural 
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frameworks. It is by dwelling in such bodily and 
communal realities that we come to know. While we 
are engaging in the tacit mode of knowing in order to 
focus on explicit knowledge, we can never articulate 
the tacit factors. By the same token, the body remains 
an inarticulate or non-verbal aspect of an experience 
of paintings in a museum. Therefore, in Polanyi’s 
terms, we use or rely on our body (which is subsidiary 
awareness) to attend to a painting (which is focal 
awareness). Normally, we can articulate what we see 
(the painting) but forget how we see (our body), since 
it is one integrated act. In this sense, the body is 
actually a perceiving device.   
 
Thoughts for Teachers: Reawakening the Body in 
an Experience of Paintings 
 
The insights described above have a number of 
implications for the teaching of art, and in particular 
for how teachers might help their students to benefit 
as much as possible from looking at paintings in 
museums. I argue that the experience of paintings in a 
museum is an embodied experience. How can 
teachers help students to have such experience 
intelligently? How can teachers enable students to 
dwell in a painting? Perhaps it is impossible for 
teachers to do this, or even if they make the attempt, 
they can never be sure whether they have been 
successful. What teachers can do is to prepare 
students in ways conducive to enabling them to make 
use of their various cognitive, social and cultural 
frameworks in experiencing a painting. For example, 
teachers can provide opportunities for students to 
become familiar with the museum environment when 
they are young, to see paintings and visit museums on 
a regular basis and to talk about their experiences of 
paintings and the museum in daily life, and in 
particular during art lessons. We may refer to these 
pedagogic activities as the “interiorizing” of the 
knowledge or experience students may make use of 
when they encounter a painting in the future (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 24). It is not a kind of training or learning 
that seeks immediate effects, but is rather groundwork 
that may enable students later to become 
meaningfully engaged with paintings in a museum. 
Making students explicitly aware of the bodily 
dimension of the experience is not particularly 
desirable. Students will experience paintings through 
their bodies, regardless of whether or not they are 
aware of doing so.   
 
Teachers should understand that museum visits and 
the experience of paintings may not make an 
observable impact on students’ learning of art, 
especially on a short-term basis. But that students 
cannot vividly describe their experience of art works 
in a museum does not necessarily mean that they gain 
nothing from the visit. Some of the knowledge gained 
is tacit rather than explicit. The experience of 
paintings in a museum may or may not result in a 
better understanding of art history, art theories or art-
making. However, the experience itself can be 
meaningful to the individual. Having a personally 
meaningful experience may then inspire museum 
visitors to learn more about art history, art theories or 
art-making.   
 
Having a certain kind of feeling evoked by a painting 
seems to be a prominent feature of experiencing 
paintings in a museum. However, it may be 
misleading for teachers to ask “What do you feel?” 
immediately after their students have looked at a 
painting, since this presupposes that the function of a 
painting is to make the viewer feel something. Asking 
students to describe what they feel reflects the long-
held belief that paintings make people feel, but there 
are times when people do not respond in this way. 
Rather than posing a vague and general question such 
as “What do you feel?” at the very beginning of the 
museum visit, perhaps the teacher may reframe the 
question thus: “Does the painting remind you of 
anything, any places or any person that you have a 
personal feeling about?” I suggest that it is important 
to allow students, and in particular students at senior 
secondary level and college students, to learn to 
understand why people respond to paintings 
predominantly with emotions and feelings. A first 
step in this direction could be, for example, for a 
teacher to initiate a student project investigating the 
history, concepts and beliefs of the expressionist and 
modernist theories. Moreover, students should be 
encouraged not to see paintings solely as expressions 
of artists’ emotions and feelings, but to explore 
paintings from perspectives other than the aesthetic. 
The emphasis in school curricula on the learning of 
forms and visual elements should be balanced by 
discussions on how paintings can be viewed from 





Museum visitors’ experience of paintings, like all 
other human experiences, possesses certain features. 
The normal un-reflective speech environment renders 
it difficult to express certain aspects of the 
experience: for example, the embodiment of the 
viewer, the way in which time is experienced, and the 
viewer’s feeling. As I have discussed in this paper on 
the non-articulated aspects of the experience, the 
regaining or recovering of the body is typical. 
Gadamer has rightly pointed out that “the power of 
the work of art suddenly tears the person experiencing 
it out of the context of his life, and yet relates him 
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back to the whole of his existence” (1965/2004, pp. 
60-61) and “every encounter with it [a work of art] 
[is] an encounter of ourselves” (1970/1976, p. 95). 
After all, museum visitors’ experience of paintings is 
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